ISP-level identification of malicious traffic: Challenges and opportunities by Andersen, Martin Fejrskov et al.
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
ISP-level identification of malicious traffic: Challenges and opportunities
Andersen, Martin Fejrskov; Vasilomanolakis, Emmanouil; Pedersen, Jens Myrup
Creative Commons License
CC BY 4.0
Publication date:
2019
Document Version
Other version
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Andersen, M. F., Vasilomanolakis, E., & Pedersen, J. M. (2019). ISP-level identification of malicious traffic:
Challenges and opportunities. Poster presented at The 24th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems, Aalborg ,
Denmark.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 24, 2020
Data Sources
ISP-level identification of malicious traffic: 
Challenges and opportunities
Martin Fejrskov Andersen, Emmanouil Vasilomanolakis, Jens Myrup Pedersen
Introduction
Introduction
• The number and diversity of IoT devices is rapidly 
increasing
• Traditional host-based anti-malware  products cannot be 
installed on the typical IoT device
• Network-based anti-malware solutions hosted by an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) can be an alternative
Problem
• Which technically and legally available methods and data 
sources does an ISP have that can provide malware 
detection on an individual and network-wide level?
Challenges
• European legislation is designed to protect the privacy of 
the subscribers, restricting which data can be used.
• Can existing methods be adapted or improved for this use 
case, or are new methods needed?
Identifying individual malware infections
• Improvement of existing detection methods using NetFlow 
and/or DNS logs, for example by using knowledge of the 
device type
• Analysis of the combined feature set for matching DNS 
and NetFlow logs
• Analysis of flows without matching DNS requests and vice 
versa
• Analysis of indirectly related DNS and Netflow data
• What is the impact of anonymization by aggregation?
Evaluating network-wide infection level
• An infected mobile phone can use a Wifi connection
• Is this counted as one or two infected subscribers?
• The EPDG CDR log may be used to identify WiFi attached 
mobile subscribers
Opportunities
ePrivacy Directive
• Regulates how ISPs are allowed to handle data related to the subscribers 
data traffic and location
• Anonymization techniques and requirements are not specified any further
• A notable conclusion is that no personal data can be used by ISPs without 
explicit consent or anonymization
• Malware detection and prevention is no exception to this
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
• Is Lex Generalis to the ePrivacy Directive
• The GDPR only applies to matters not covered by the ePrivacy Directive
Legislation
Commercial
• Approximately 60 commercial products were surveyed
• Some analyse only Netflow or DNS data
• Some analyse both Netflow and DNS data, but as independent analyses
• None perform a behavioural analysis on the combined feature set of DNS 
and NetFlow data
Academic
• Primary focus also seem to be on either DNS or NetFlow, but not both
• Some approaches use features from both DNS and NetFlow: 
oRinkel Hananto, Charles Lim and Heru Purnomo Ipung: ”Detecting 
Network Security Threats Using Domain Name System and NetFlow 
Traffic”, 2018
oKuochen Wang, Chun-Ying Huang, Shang-Jyh Lin and Ying-Dar Lina: ”A 
fuzzy pattern-based filtering algorithm for botnet detection”, 2011
Related work
Data source Contents Usage restrictions
IP assignment log IP address, IMSI/IMEI/DSL-number Anonymized
NAT log Internal/external IP address, port block Anonymized
BSS database Person name, geographical address, IMSI/DSL-number Contract/consent
CPE information Attached device name, MAC and IP Contract/consent
EPDG CDR log IP address, IMSI, RAT type (wifi) Anonymized
Cell database Geographical address, gain/height/tilt etc. None
Mobility event log IMSI/IMEI, RAT type, cell ID Anonymized
Netflow log TCP/UDP/IP session information Anonymized
DNS log IP address, port, queried domain name and response Anonymized
Traffic malware log IP address, malware type Contract/consent
PGW application log IMSI/IMEI, IP address, application specific information Contract/consent
PGW flow log IMSI/IMEI, TCP/UDP/IP session and application information Contract/consent
• Data already being processed for the purpose of transmission 
must be anonymized before additional processing
• Data not being processed for the purpose of transmission or as 
part of a value added service cannot be processed
• Data can be processed for a specific value added service but 
only if a relevant contract or consent is available
Data sources
• Data sources available to a typical ISP 
using Telenor Denmark as example
• Consent cannot be obtained from all 
subscribers.
• Mobility related logs are irrelevant for 
malware detection
• Logs like the IP assignment log are 
irrelevant if anonymized
Anonymization
• Hashing of subscriber IP addresses etc. 
to prevent direct identification
• Aggregation of subscribers to prevent 
event correlation based identification
